

## 협업 기반 배송 서비스 네트워크에 대한 동적 설계

## Dynamic design for collaborative delivery services

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
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# Introduction




## Global e-commerce penetration rate in 2021

Ecommerce Sales by Country (2021)



Source: eMarker




Online retail sales as of % of total (Source: The Economist, March 2021)

# Introduction



## Reasons for increase in contactless consumption


- Effects of Coronavirus Pandemic on Parcel Delivery Businesses





# Introduction

- Effects of Coronavirus Pandemic on Parcel Delivery Businesses**



**Impact of COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic on food delivery app usage in South Korea as of June 2020, by age group**

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# Introduction




## Literature review

Category	Previous studies
Parcel Delivery Service	Lenz et al. (2004)
	Lierow et al. (2013)
	Ko et al. (2007)
Last-mile delivery	Galkin et al. (2019)
	Giret et al. (2018)
	Kanuri et al. (2019)
	Clausen et al. (2016)
	Manerba et al. (2018)
	Ko et al. (2018)
Collaboration	Chung et al. (2016)
	Wang et al.(2018)
	Gansterer and Hartl (2017)
	Yea et al (2018)
	Timmer et al.(2013)
	Do et al.(2019)
	Villamizar et al.(2015)

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# Problem Description

## Dynamic design for collaborative delivery services



Short-term collaboration

Temporal collaboration

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# Problem description



- ▶ This study suggests a sustainable collaboration model for increasing the competitiveness of each participating company.



- Dynamic design for collaborative delivery services



Profit Allocation by Shapley Value and nucleolus based allocation



# Mathematical Model



- $I$  : set of delivery service companies,  $I = \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$   
 $J$  : set of merging regions,  $J = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$   
 $T$  : set of planning periods,  $T = \{1, 2, \dots, l\}$   
 $K$  : set of service classes,  $K = \{1, 2, \dots, p\}$   
 $f_{ijkt}$  : fixed cost accruing from operating the service class  $k$  of the company  $i$  in region  $j$  at period  $t$ ,  $i \in I, j \in J, k \in K, t \in T$ ,  
 $Q_{it}$  : remaining capacity of the terminal for processing demand amount of company  $i$  at period  $t$ ,  $i \in I, t \in T$   
 $d_{ijkt}$  : yearly demand with service class  $k$  of the company  $i$  in region  $j$  during planning period  $t$ ,  $i \in I, j \in J, t \in T, k \in K$   
 $D_{jkt}$  : yearly demand with service class  $k$  within region  $j$  during planning period  $t$ ,  $j \in J, k \in K, t \in T$ , i. e.,  

$$D_{jkt} = \sum_{i=1}^m d_{ijkt}$$
  
 $w_{kt}$  : weight for revenue per item with service class  $k$  during planning period  $t$  in delivery hub  
 $r_{ijkt}$  : net profit contributed by one unit of demand with service class  $k$  of company  $i$  within region  $j$  during planning period  $t$ ,  $i \in I, j \in J, t \in T, k \in K$   
 $s_{ijk}$  : set-up cost for service class  $k$  of company  $i$  within region  $j$ ,  $i \in I, j \in J, k \in K$   
 $v_{ijk}$  : shut-down profit for service class  $k$  of company  $i$  within region  $j$ ,  $i \in I, j \in J, k \in K$   
 Decision variable:  
 $x_{ijkt}$  : binary variables such that  $x_{ijkt} = 1$ , if the service class  $k$  of the company  $i$  in region  $j$  at planning period  $t$ , is selected, otherwise,  $x_{ijkt} = 0$ ,  $i \in I, j \in J, k \in K, t \in T$



# Mathematical Model



## Non-Linear model (P)

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Max } \phi_1(x) &= \sum_{t \in T} \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} (r_{1jkt} D_{jkt} - f_{1jkt}) x_{1jkt} + \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} (f_{1jkt} - r_{1jkt} d_{1jkt}) + \sum_{t=1}^{l-1} \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} \{s_{1jk} \cdot x_{1jkt} \cdot (1 - x_{1jk,t+1}) - v_{1jk} \cdot (1 - x_{1jkt}) \cdot x_{1jk,t+1}\} \\
 &\vdots \\
 \text{Max } \phi_m(x) &= \sum_{t \in T} \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} (r_{mjkt} D_{jkt} - f_{mjkt}) x_{mjkt} + \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} (f_{mjkt} - r_{mjkt} d_{mjkt}) + \sum_{t=1}^{l-1} \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} \{s_{mjk} \cdot x_{mjkt} \cdot (1 - x_{mjk,t+1}) - v_{mjk} \cdot (1 - x_{mjkt}) \cdot x_{mjk,t+1}\}
 \end{aligned}$$

s. t.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \sum_{i \in I} x_{ijkt} &= 1 & j \in J, k \in K, t \in T \\
 \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} w_{kt} (D_{jkt} x_{ijkt} - d_{ijkt}) &\leq Q_{it} & i \in I, t \in T \\
 x_{ijk} &\in \{0, 1\} & i \in I, j \in J, k \in K, t \in T
 \end{aligned}$$



# Mathematical Model



The following new variables  $y$  and  $z$  are generated to linearize

$$y_{ijk,t,t+1} = x_{ijkt} \cdot (1 - x_{ijk,t+1})$$

$$z_{ijk,t,t+1} = x_{ijk,t+1} \cdot (1 - x_{ijkt})$$

$x_{ijkt}$	$x_{ijk,t+1}$	$y$
1	1	0
1	0	1
0	1	0
0	0	0

$x_{ijkt}$	$x_{ijk,t+1}$	$z$
1	1	0
1	0	0
0	1	1
1	1	0

Then we can linearize

$$y_{ijk,t,t+1} \leq \frac{x_{ijkt} - x_{ijk,t+1} + 1}{2}$$

$$z_{ijk,t,t+1} \leq \frac{1 - x_{ijkt} - x_{ijk,t+1}}{2}$$



# Mathematical Model



## Linear model (P2)

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Max } \phi_1(x) &= \sum_{t \in T} \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} (r_{1jkt} D_{jkt} - f_{1jkt}) x_{1jkt} + \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} (f_{1jkt} - r_{1jkt} d_{1jkt}) + \sum_{t=1}^{l-1} \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} \{s_{1jk} \cdot y_{1jkt,t+1} - v_{1jk} \cdot z_{1k,t+1}\} \\
 &\vdots \\
 \text{Max } \phi_m(x) &= \sum_{t \in T} \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} (r_{mjkt} D_{jkt} - f_{mjkt}) x_{mjkt} + \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} (f_{mjkt} - r_{mjkt} d_{mjkt}) + \sum_{t=1}^{l-1} \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} \{s_{1jk} \cdot y_{1jkt,t+1} - v_{1jk} \cdot z_{1k,t+1}\}
 \end{aligned}$$

s. t.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \sum_{i \in I} x_{ijkt} &= 1 & j \in J, k \in K, t \in T \\
 \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{k \in K} w_{kt} (D_{jkt} x_{ijkt} - d_{ijkt}) &\leq Q_{it} & i \in I, t \in T \\
 y_{ijk,t,t+1} &\leq \frac{x_{ijkt} - x_{ijk,t+1} + 1}{2} & i \in I, j \in J, k \in K, t \in T \\
 z_{ijk,t,t+1} &\leq \frac{1 - x_{ijkt} - x_{ijk,t+1}}{2} & i \in I, j \in J, k \in K, t \in T \\
 x_{ijk} &\in \{0, 1\} & i \in I, j \in J, k \in K, t \in T
 \end{aligned}$$

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## Profit allocation

Max-min Criterion

Max-sum Criterion

Shapley Value

Nucleolus

# Solution Procedure



**Maximize**  $\alpha$

Subject to

$$Z_1 \geq \alpha$$

$$Z_2 \geq \alpha$$

$\vdots$

$$Z_m \geq \alpha$$

where  $\alpha = \text{Min} (Z_1, Z_2, \dots, Z_m)$

$$\text{Maximize} = Z_1 + Z_2 + \dots + Z_m$$

**Shapley value allocation** is known as

"The most equitable profit sharing method in cooperative game theory"

Concept to distribute synergies obtained through the coalition according to the marginal contribution of game participants

**Core vs. Nucleolus**

**Completeness:** Profits are entirely divided into participating company classes

**Rationality:** By joining the grand coalition, company classes do not receive less than they would if they chose to be part of any smaller coalition of company classes

**Marginality:** Company classes are provided at most their marginal profits.



# Numerical Example



- 3 delivery service companies
- 4 merging regions
- 1 service class

## Remaining capacity of terminal

Terminal	Capacity
1	480
2	430
3	525

## Data for delivery demand

	Years	R <sub>1</sub>	R <sub>2</sub>	R <sub>3</sub>	R <sub>4</sub>
C <sub>A</sub>	1 <sup>st</sup>	51	85	58	20
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	85	22	96	26
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	72	36	54	75
C <sub>B</sub>	1 <sup>st</sup>	15	63	34	85
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	25	93	45	26
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	43	64	74	35
C <sub>C</sub>	1 <sup>st</sup>	19	87	72	57
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	26	62	36	85
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	75	22	88	76

## Data for daily fixed cost.

	Years	R <sub>1</sub>	R <sub>2</sub>	R <sub>3</sub>	R <sub>4</sub>
C <sub>A</sub>	1 <sup>st</sup>	83	68	52	214
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	196	201	261	259
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	83	225	271	293
C <sub>B</sub>	1 <sup>st</sup>	130	168	272	111
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	127	86	185	275
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	236	50	67	104
C <sub>C</sub>	1 <sup>st</sup>	136	121	64	79
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	132	69	298	227
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	89	140	175	258



# Conclusion



## Contribution

- Win-win strategy through increasing net profit of each participating company considering long-term collaboration
- Sustainable coalition

## Further Research Areas

- Robust design for collaboration
- Collaborative operation among fulfillment centers